Federal Judge Rules Trump Administration Violated Free Speech Rights in Pro-Palestinian Deportation Campaign

When Do Non-Citizens Get First Amendment Rights? A Reagan Judge Just Rewrote the Rules

A Reagan-appointed federal judge just delivered what might be the most constitutionally significant – and personally scathing – rebuke of the Trump administration yet. In a stunning 161-page opinion released Tuesday, U.S. District Judge William Young didn’t just rule against the administration’s efforts to deport pro-Palestinian protesters and academics.

He accused the President and his Cabinet secretaries of deliberately weaponizing immigration law to terrorize people into silence. But here’s the question nobody seems to be asking: when did non-citizens on American soil get full First Amendment protections against deportation based on their political speech? The answer is more complicated than either side wants to admit.

At a Glance

• Judge William Young ruled the Trump administration’s deportation efforts against pro-Palestinian protesters were unconstitutional
• The 161-page decision accuses Trump of being a “bully” focused on “retribution” and of fundamentally misunderstanding the Constitution
• Young found Secretaries Marco Rubio and Kristi Noem deliberately coordinated to chill free speech rights
• The ruling came after a two-week trial brought by the American Association of University Professors and Middle East Studies Association
• At stake: whether the government can use immigration law to suppress political speech by non-citizens lawfully in the U.S.

The Constitutional Collision

Here’s what makes this case so legally fascinating: it sits at the intersection of two powerful – and often contradictory – constitutional principles. On one hand, the First Amendment protects freedom of speech. On the other hand, the plenary power doctrine gives Congress nearly unlimited authority over immigration, including who gets to stay in the country and who gets deported.

Judge Young sided decisively with the First Amendment. In language that reads more like a constitutional sermon than a legal opinion, he wrote:

“No one’s freedom of speech is unlimited, of course, but these limits are the same for both citizens and non-citizens alike.”

That’s a bold statement. And it’s one that challenges decades of Supreme Court precedent holding that non-citizens – especially those without permanent legal status – have far fewer constitutional protections than citizens when it comes to immigration enforcement.

Young went further, finding by “clear and convincing evidence” that Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Homeland Security Secretary Kristi Noem “deliberately and with purposeful aforethought” coordinated their departments to chill the free speech and assembly rights of pro-Palestinian non-citizens. The judge wrote that their strategy was “more insidious” than simply deporting all pro-Palestinian non-citizens – which would have sparked immediate outcry. Instead, they targeted a few prominent figures like Mahmoud Khalil and Rumeysa Ozturk to send a message.

“Rather, the intent of the Secretaries was more insidious … to target a few for speaking out and then use the full rigor of the Immigration and Nationality Act (in ways it had never been used before) to have them publicly deported with the goal of tamping down pro-Palestinian student protests.” – Judge William Young

The Plenary Power Problem

Here’s where constitutional law gets messy. The Supreme Court has long held that Congress has nearly absolute power over immigration – what legal scholars call the “plenary power doctrine.” Under this doctrine, the political branches can exclude or deport non-citizens for reasons that would be blatantly unconstitutional if applied to citizens.

In cases like Kleindienst v. Mandel (1972), the Court said the government can deny visas to foreigners based on their political views, as long as there’s a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” for the exclusion. And in Harisiades v. Shaughnessy (1952), the Court upheld deportations of lawful permanent residents based on their Communist Party membership – pure political association.

So how did Judge Young get around this? He made a crucial distinction: these protesters weren’t being excluded at the border or denied entry. They were already lawfully present in the United States. And once non-citizens are physically present on American soil – especially those here legally on student or work visas – they receive substantially more constitutional protections.

The Supreme Court confirmed this principle in Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886), holding that the Fourteenth Amendment’s protections apply to “all persons within the territorial jurisdiction” of the United States, not just citizens. The Court has repeatedly held that non-citizens within the U.S. are protected by the Due Process Clause, which includes protection against government retaliation for protected speech.

When Immigration Law Becomes a Weapon

Judge Young’s most powerful argument is that the Trump administration didn’t just enforce immigration law – they twisted it into a tool for viewpoint discrimination. He found that Rubio and Noem used provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act “in ways it had never been used before” specifically to punish political speech they disagreed with.

This matters constitutionally because while the government has broad power to enforce immigration laws, it cannot enforce those laws in ways that violate other constitutional rights. It’s the same principle that says police can arrest you for speeding, but they can’t pull you over because they don’t like your political bumper sticker.

The government’s argument was that they were deporting these individuals under existing statutory authority – specifically provisions allowing deportation of those whose presence is “adversarial to the foreign policy and national security interests of the United States.” But Young found this was pretextual. The real motivation, he concluded, was silencing criticism of U.S.-Israel policy.

Young wrote that Trump has a “palpable misunderstanding that the government simply cannot seek retribution for speech he disdains.” He called it a “great threat to Americans’ freedom of speech” – notably, he said Americans’ freedom, even though the case involves non-citizens, because the chilling effect extends to everyone on campus.

“Yet government retribution for speech (precisely what has happened here) is directly forbidden by the First Amendment.” – Judge William Young

The Separation of Powers Question

There’s another constitutional dimension here that Young highlighted: Trump’s actions violated his oath to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution.” This is a separation of powers argument – the President doesn’t get to decide which constitutional protections to honor based on his policy preferences.

Young, appointed by President Ronald Reagan over 40 years ago, Trump cancels meeting with top Democrats as government shutdown looms invoked his judicial independence and suggested Trump is counting on Americans being too divided to defend constitutional principles. He ended his opinion with a direct challenge: “I fear President Trump believes the American people are so divided that today they will not stand up, fight for, and defend our most precious constitutional values so long as they are lulled into thinking their own personal interests are not affected. Is he correct?”

That’s an extraordinary rhetorical question for a federal judge to pose in an official opinion. It reads less like legal analysis and more like a warning about democratic backsliding.

But here’s the constitutional tension: the President does have broad authority over immigration enforcement through his control of the executive branch. The Constitution gives him the executive power and makes him responsible for ensuring laws are faithfully executed. When Congress passes immigration statutes giving the executive branch discretion over deportations, that’s a legitimate exercise of separated powers.

The question is whether that discretion includes targeting people based on their political speech. Young says absolutely not. But future courts – including this Supreme Court – might see it differently.

The Historical Precedent

This isn’t the first time the government has tried to use immigration law to suppress dissent. During the Red Scare of the 1950s, the government deported non-citizens based on their Communist associations – and the Supreme Court upheld it. During World War I, the government used the Espionage Act and immigration law together to silence anti-war activists.

What’s different now is that courts are increasingly skeptical of such efforts, particularly when they target speech that’s clearly protected by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has moved away from the more deferential approach of the Cold War era, though it has never fully abandoned the plenary power doctrine.

Judge Young is essentially arguing that we’ve learned from history – that using deportation as a tool to silence political dissent is un-American, regardless of what the law technically allows. He’s asking: even if the government can do this under immigration statutes, should the Constitution permit it?

What the Founders Would Say

Madison would almost certainly side with Judge Young. He wrote extensively about the danger of government using its powers to suppress dissent, particularly in his opposition to the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. Those laws allowed the deportation of “dangerous” aliens and criminalized criticism of the government – exactly the kind of viewpoint discrimination Young is condemning here.

Hamilton, more sympathetic to executive power, might argue that immigration control is inherently a political question where the President needs flexibility. But even Hamilton believed in the rule of law constraining executive discretion.

Jefferson would point out – correctly – that the Founders never anticipated the modern administrative state using immigration law as a tool for political control on this scale.

The Constitutional Stakes

This case is almost certainly headed to the Supreme Court, where it will test whether the conservative majority’s professed commitment to free speech extends to protecting critics of Israel and U.S. foreign policy. It will also test whether the Court’s recent skepticism of the administrative state applies when the President uses that state apparatus to punish dissent.

Young’s opinion is a constitutional alarm bell. Whether you agree with pro-Palestinian protesters or find their views abhorrent, the principle at stake is fundamental: the government cannot use its regulatory powers to silence political speech it dislikes.

The Trump administration will appeal, arguing that immigration enforcement is within executive discretion and that national security and foreign policy concerns justify these actions. They’ll invoke the plenary power doctrine and argue that Judge Young exceeded his authority by second-guessing executive branch judgments about who poses a threat to U.S. interests.

But Young has forced a constitutional reckoning: Are we a nation where political speech – even deeply unpopular political speech – is protected from government retaliation? Or do we have a two-tiered system where citizens get full First Amendment rights while non-citizens can be silenced through deportation?

The answer will define whether the First Amendment means what it says: “Congress shall make no law … abridging the freedom of speech.” Even when Congress calls that law immigration enforcement.